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12.1  Introduction 
At first blush, Canada and Australia appear to be very similar nations. Both 
are former British colonies and are members of the Commonwealth. Both are 
parliamentary federations  and constitutional  monarchies, although Australia 
may be close to becoming a republic. The land masses of  the two countries 
qualify them among the largest nations on earth. They are both small, open 
economies endowed with ample natural resources. Both nations have signifi- 
cant aboriginal or First Nations populations, both have vast parts of their terri- 
tory that are sparsely populated, and on and on. And at the broad policy level, 
Canada’s system of equalization payments was patterned, conceptually, after 
the philosophy underpinning Australia’s Commonwealth Grants Commission. 
And Australia has followed Canada in relying on “executive federalism” as a 
key policy and coordination institution, even to the point where COAG (the 
Council of Australian Governments) is currently operating much more effec- 
tively than Canada’s FMCs (First Ministers’ Conferences). 
To  be sure, there are some important differences. Australia does not have a 
United States on its border with the resulting dominant impact on trade, cul- 
tural identity, and policy independence. Moreover, Australia has no equivalent 
to Quebec-a  province that is linguistically, culturally, and legally (civil law 
rather than common law) distinct. At the institutional level, Canadian scholars 
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have duly noted the differences in our upper chambers and, on more than one 
occasion, we have unsuccessfully attempted to convert our appointed Senate 
into the Australian “triple E’  version-elected,  equal, and effective. Even rec- 
ognizing these  important differences,  Canadians  and Australians  (let alone 
others) tend, nonetheless, to assume that the similarities far outweigh the dif- 
ferences, with  the  result  that  relevant  literature  is  replete  with  Canadian- 
Australian comparisons, the most recent of which is Boothe 1996. 
From this vantage point, therefore, one might assume that the rationale for 
comparing subnational  budgetary  and  stabilization  policies  in Canada  and 
Australia is to assess important or intriguing differences in what otherwise is 
an essentially similar approach to the conduct of provinciallstate fiscal policies. 
Reality, however, is quite another matter: one can make a convincing case 
that the taxation, spending, and borrowing autonomy of the Canadian prov- 
inces and of the Australian states represent the polar extremes in modern, ma- 
ture federations. The wide-ranging powers and fiscal autonomy of the Cana- 
dian provinces place them at least on par with the Swiss cantons. Contrast this 
with the Australian states, which have no effective access to broad-based taxa- 
tion (sales andor income taxes) and, therefore, suffer from an incredible verti- 
cal fiscal imbalance-Commonwealth  transfers exceed the states’ own-source 
revenues. And, of course, the operations of the Australian Loan Council have 
traditionally limited the states’ borrowing autonomy, although it may have in- 
creased the states’ borrowing ability since they did so with the imprimatur of 
Canberra.’ Given all of this, it should then come as no surprise that Australia 
has in place an institutional framework designed to ensure that the states’ bud- 
gets are harmonized and/or coordinated with the Commonwealth’s overall phi- 
losophy and objectives. Likewise, it should not come as a surprise that on far 
too many occasions the fiscal policy initiatives of the Canadian provinces have 
created significant negative spillovers for the Canadian macro strategy. 
Cognizant of these divergent subnational fiscal environments, the analysis 
begins  by  detailing the different constitutionalhnstitutional frameworks  for 
Canadian provinces and Australian states (sec. 12.2). Beyond the tabular ap- 
proach to constitutional differences, attention is directed to the allocation of 
taxing powers, to the extent of vertical fiscal imbalance, to the degree of condi- 
tionality of fiscal transfers, to an assessment of the two countries’ equalization 
programs, and, finally, to regional disparities. With this as backdrop, and in 
line with the budgetary-institutions  theme of the volume, section  12.3 high- 
lights the operations of the extensive degree of Commonwealth-state fiscal co- 
ordination, while section 12.4 contrasts this with the lack of federal-provincial 
fiscal coordination in the Canadian federation. 
The analysis then shifts to the 1990s fiscal history at the national level (sec- 
1. For purposes of this paper, “Canberra” and the “Commonwealth government” are used inter- 
changeably to refer to the central government in Australia while “Ottawa” and the “federal govem- 
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tion 12.5 for Canada and section 12.6 for Australia), replete with the manner 
in which national fiscal policy interplays with provincial and state fiscal policy. 
The final substantive section presents and assesses Standard and Poor’s credit 
ratings for Australian states and Canadian provinces. An integrative conclusion 
completes the paper. 
Because of the polar nature of  these two fiscal systems, this comparative 
case study may provide useful insights with respect to some of the analytical 
issues that feature prominently in other papers in the volume. In particular, the 
decentralized budgetary and borrowing flexibility of  the Canadian provinces 
probably has some implications for the EU in the era of monetary union. Like- 
wise the impressive recent deficit turnaround in Canada may shed light on is- 
sues such as the role of a strong finance minister, the role of deficit targets, and 
the importance of transparency-issues  that occupy center stage in the anal- 
yses of other papers in this volume. And with its Charter of Budget Honesty, 
Australia has carried transparency to new heights. Where relevant, these rela- 
tionships between budgetary institutions and fiscal performance will be high- 
lighted. 
12.2  The ConstitutionaVInstitutional Frameworks Relating 
to Subnational Budgetary Autonomy 
The theme of this section is that a comparative analysis of the subnational 
fiscalhudgetary policies and processes of the Canadian provinces and Austra- 
lian states can only be understood in the context of the differing constitutional/ 
institutional frameworks in the two countries. Toward this end, table 12.1 pro- 
vides selected salient features of the comparative constitutional backdrop. We 
begin the more detailed analysis by directing attention to the allocation of tax- 
ing powers. 
12.2.1  The Allocation of Taxing Powers 
In the  1930s, both the Australian states and Canadian provinces had, de 
facto, significant and similar taxing powers. For example, the Canadian prov- 
inces (including municipalities) accounted for nearly 70 percent of total own- 
source revenues in the federation. In Australia, the states accounted for 46 per- 
cent of  total taxation, including 60 percent of  income tax revenues (Walsh 
1996, 125). In the 1940s, both countries dramatically centralized their taxation 
systems as part of  the war effort. To this point, therefore, their experiences 
were roughly similar. 
In the postwar period, however, the Canadian provinces regained their for- 
mer taxation powers, whereas, in Australia, the Commonwealth effectively 
precluded any resurgence in state taxation. As noted in table 12.1, there were 
two key events that led to the maintenance of the Commonwealth’s monopoly 
of broad-based taxation. One was the High Court’s peculiar decision to inter- 
pret a state-levied general retail sales tax as a customs duty, thereby prohibiting Table 12.1  Fiscal Federalism in Canada and Australia: The Constitutionall 
Institutional Framework 
Area  Australia  Canada 
A. General provisions 
1. Powers  Formal listing of Commonwealth 
powers. Most of these are 
concurrent, but with 
Commonwealth paramountcy. 
Residual powers to states. 
2. Internal economic 
union (and judicial 
interpretation) 
Commonwealth trade and 
commerce power given 
expansive reading by the High 
Court (similar to scope of U.S. 




1. Direct taxes 
Income taxes 
2. Indirect taxation 
Commonwealth and states can 
both levy direct taxation. 
However, Commonwealth has 
effectively monopolized 
personal and corporate income 
taxes: States will lose 
Commonwealth grants if they 
reenter income taxation. No 
state has yet done so. 
Except for customs duties, are 
concurrent powers. But High 
Court prohibited state sales 
taxes on grounds that they 
were the customs duty. 
Australia has no general sales 
tax. 
Federal and provincial 
governments have own 
listing of powers, section 91 
for Ottawa and section 92 
for the provinces. Residual 
power to federal government. 
Federal trade and commerce 
power given much less 
expansive reading by the 
Supreme Court. Provincial 
head of power (“property 
and civil rights”) serves as 
de facto residual clause. 
Canada is much more 
decentralized than is 
Australia. 
Both federal and provincial 
governments can levy direct 
taxation. 
Provinces collect roughly 40 
percent of personal income 
taxation. Nine provinces 
piggyback off federal 
income tax, while Quebec 
has its own separate PIT. 
Three provinces have 
separate corporate income 
tax (Quebec, Ontario, 
Alberta) while the rest 
piggyback on Ottawa’s 
corporate tax. 
Provinces cannot levy indirect 
taxes. But provincial sales 
taxes (following British 
interpretation) were viewed 
as a direct tax. All provinces 
except Alberta now levy 
sales taxes. Federal 
government levies value- 
added tax (GST). Hence, 
joint occupancy with limited 
harmonization (only 
Quebec, New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland, and Nova 
Scotia have harmonized 
their PST with federal 
GST). 305  Subnational Budgetary Policies 
Table 12.1  (continued) 
Area  Australia  Canada 
3. Natural resources  Concurrent, with Commonwealth 
paramountcy 
C. Intergovernmental  Section 96 states that the 
grants  Commonwealth may grant 
financial assistance to any 
state on such terms or 
conditions as parliament thinks 
fit. As noted above, the 
Commonwealth has used this 
power to prevent states from 
levying income taxes. This 
provision provides the 
authority for the 
Commonwealth’s specific- 
purpose grants and for the 
general revenue grants falling 
under the Commonwealth 
Grants Commission. 
Provincial jurisdiction, except 
for resources on Canada 
(nonprovince) lands. When 
Saskatchewan and Alberta 
joined the federation in 
1905,  Ottawa maintained the 
subsurface property rights. It 
transferred these subsurface 
rights to these provinces 
around 1930. The result is 
that these two provinces own 
the subsurface rights on 
virtually all the (energy rich) 
lands within their borders. 
Generalized federal spending 
power provides mechanism 
for Ottawa to make grants to 
the provinces (but probably 
not in a way that serves to 
regulate activities in the 
provincial domain). The 
principle of equalization 
(but no precise formula) has 
been enshrined since 1982. 
Recently, the federal 
government has agreed to 
curtail the exercise of its 
spending power in areas of 
exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction-now  requires 
broad provincial support 
and opting out with 
compensation for those 
provinces not on side. 
state action (since customs duties were the prerogative of the Commonwealth). 
More recently, the High Court has also struck down state excises on gasoline 
and  tobacco. The  other, and  more important, decision  was  the Common- 
wealth’s threat under s.96 (panel C, table 12.1) to withdraw financial transfers 
from any state that reentered the income tax field. Given the critical role that 
these Commonwealth-state transfers play in state revenues (elaborated in the 
following section), it is perhaps not surprising that no state has seriously con- 
sidered reentering the income tax field. 
The result of  all of  this appears in tables 12.2 and 12.3 for Australia and 
Canada respectively. Focusing initially on the Australian data, a few features 
merit highlighting. First, very few tax bases are shared. Of the first ten entries 306  Thomas J. Courchene 
Table 12.2  Access to Revenue Sources: Australia, 1992-93 
Percentage Distribution 
Total  States/ 
($ billions)  Commonwealth  Territories  Local 
A. Taxes, fees, and fines 
1. Income taxes (personal 
and corporate) 
2. Property taxes 
Financial transactions 
Other 
3. Sales taxes 
General sales tax 
Excises 
Gambling and insurance 
International trade 
4. Payroll taxes 
General 
Selective 
5. Taxes on use of goods 
and performance of 
activities 
6. Fees and fines 
Total taxes, fees, and fines 
B. Operating surplus of  public 


























































Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 1995. section 24. 
in table 12.2 (up to and including row A5) eight are allocated 100 percent to 
either the Commonwealth or the state/local level, with the remaining two hav- 
ing at least a 95 percent share allocated to one or the other level of (95.5 per- 
cent of excises accrue to the Commonwealth, while 96.4 percent of taxes on 
goods accrue to the stateAoca1  level). Of the 12 Canadian tax categories (table 
12.3), only 3 fall in this 95 percent plus range-all  property taxes are local, 
the international component of  sales taxes (customs) is federal, and virtually 
all natural resource revenues are provincial.* The second general point is that 
2. While this observation obviously depends on the manner in which tax sources are classified, 
the thrust of the argument would hold under alternative classifications as well.  In terms of the 
classification utilized in tables 12.2 and 12.3, some elaboration is probably in order. In table 12.2, 
the states’ general payroll taxes accrue to the consolidated revenue fund and are part of the states 
general revenues; i.e., they are not social insurance levies. Indeed, in the OECD definition of 
social insurance levies, Australia has none. It has no unemployment insurance program. Workers’ 
compensation is compulsory for firms, but this is run largely through third-party (private) insur- 
ance. And there is no Australian equivalent to the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan, the compulsory 
public pension system. Entry B of table 12.2 (public trading enterprises) is probably quite similar 
to entry 9 in table  12.3-for  example, they would both include the provincial/state monopolies 
for the various utilities. The “financial transactions” entry under the property tax heading in table 
12.2 is generally referred to as “stamp duties”-taxes  on securities transactions. And so on. 307  Subnational Budgetary Policies 
Table 12.3  Access to Revenue Sources: Canada, 1992 
Percentage Distribution 
Total 
($ billions)  Federal  Provincial 
1. Income taxes 
Personal 
Corporate 
2. Property taxes 
3. Consumption taxes 
General sales 
Fuel 
Alcohol and tobacco 
International (customs) 
4. Social insurance levies 
5. Sales of  goods and services 
6. Licences and permits 
7. Natural resource revenues 
8. Miscellaneous taxes 













































Source: Canadian Tax Foundation 1994, table 4.3. 
"Entirely or largely provincial. 
bLargely local. 
'Primarily the GST, a value-added tax. 
dPrimarily general retail sales taxes at the provincial level. 
'Federal component is largely unemployment insurance premiums, and provincial component is 
premiums for workers' compensation. The public pension premiums (CPP/QPP) are not included. 
not only are the states left with a narrow set of own-source revenues, but even 
these are under increasing competitive pressure. Payroll taxes (which are prob- 
ably the closest thing the states have to a broad-based tax) are increasingly 
viewed as problematic in an era of  high unemployment, and they are under 
further pressure because the Commonwealth has recently begun encroaching 
on this base with pension contributions. As a result of the recent (1995) Com- 
petition Principles Agreement, which opens the state's public-sector business 
enterprises to interstate competition, it will be more difficult for the states to 
maintain their large revenues arising from the operating surplus of Public Trad- 
ing Enterprises (row B of table 12.2). And because of the inherent mobility of 
financial transactions, the various taxes on financial transactions (stamp duties) 
are also coming under pressure-in  the mid-1990s Queensland cut its stamp 
duties on marketable securities by 50 percent in order to attract securities busi- 
ness from New South Wales. Given the inherent mobility of this tax base, other 
states had no choice but to follow Queensland's lead. 
Table 12.3 presents comparable tax allocation data for the Canadian federa- 
tion. Ottawa maintains just under two-thirds of the personal and corporate in- 308  Thomas J. Courchene 
come taxation and about half of the general sales taxation (the federal share is 
the GST, a value-added tax, and the provincial share relates to the point-of- 
sale retail sales taxes). While most of the remaining detail is left to the reader, 
the natural resource revenues entry (row 7) is critical for the ensuing analysis. 
It is not just that nearly 100 percent of the revenues from this source accrue to 
the provinces. It is also that, for two provinces, Saskatchewan and Alberta, the 
subsurface rights (e.g., for oil and gas) rest with the province, not with the 
owners of the land (see row B3 of table 12.1). 
The final row of each table presents aggregate revenues and their distribu- 
tion between the national and subnational governments. In Australia, the Com- 
monwealth’s share is 71.2 percent, while the federal share in Canada is less 
than 50 percent (46.7 percent). What is also very evident is that, subject to 
some adjustment for exchange rates,3 the level of overall taxation in Australia 
is much lower than in Canada. In a recent paper comparing taxation in Canada 
and Australia, Dahlby and Wilson (1996) argue that one of the reasons for this 
likely has to do with the fact that so many tax sources are shared in Canada. 
The analogy here is that of  a common-property resource.  Hence, sharing a 
common tax base will lead to “overtaxation” in the same way that the “tragedy 
of the commons” leads to “overgrazing.” For example, on at least two occa- 
sions over the last decade Ottawa reduced personal income taxes in order to 
bring Canadian personal income tax rates more in line with those in the United 
States. On both occasions, some provinces (e.g., Ontario) responded by raising 
their own tax rates, thereby “taking up” the vacated tax room. This is a fiscal 
federalism example of the common-pool or 1/N problem that plays center stage 
in many papers in this volume. 
For our purposes, however, the key message that emerges from tables 12.2 
and 12.3 is that the Canadian provinces have much more in the way of mean- 
ingful tax autonomy and flexibility than have the Australian states, including 
access to broad-based tax sources such as sales and personalkorporate  income 
taxation. As Walsh (1996,  115) has noted, “Australia has by  far the highest 
degree of vertical fiscal imbalance among the major federations in the industri- 
alized world. It is even high by the standards of most unitary countries.” 
12.2.2  Vertical Fiscal Imbalances 
Tables 12.4 and  12.5 present data on vertical fiscal imbalances, inter alia, 
for the two federations. While the fiscal years differ, the qualitative implica- 
tions derived from putting the Canadian data on a comparable fiscal year would 
3. The Canadian dollar depreciated relative to the Australian dollar over the recent period. In 
terms of the number of Canadian cents per Australian dollar, the average of monthly exchange 
rates was 91.1 cents in 1990, 89.2 cents in 1991, 88.7 cents in 1992, 87.6 cents in 1993, 100 cents 
in 1994, 101.7 cents in  1995, and 107 cents in  1996. The PPP values are quite different because 
the Canadian dollar is considerably undervalued. On a PPP basis for 1996, the Australian rate is 
135 Australian cents per U.S. dollar, and the Canadian rate is  122 cents per U.S. dollar, with 
roughly similar values for 1994 (134 and 125 respectively [OECD data]). Table 12.4  Horizontal Equalization in Action: Australia, 1993-94 
Grants as a 
% of Own 
Own Revenues  Commonwealth  Grants  Grants Plus Revenues  Revenues 
(standardized)  ($ per capita)  (1+3+4)  ((3+4)+ 1) 
% of 
$ per  National 
% of 
Specific  $ per  National 
capita  Average"  General  Purpose  capita  Average 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 









































































Sources: Commonwealth Grants Commission 1995, table VI-10 (columns 1-2); table 3, Budget Paper no. 3, pursuant to the 1993-94 Australian budget (columns 3-4). 
"These percentages represent the difference in revenue-raising capacity across the states, since tax effort is held constant. Table 12.5  Horizontal Equalization in Action: Canada, 1991-92 
Own Revenues 
Own Revenues  Own Revenues  Plus Equalization, 
(standardizedy  Plus Equalizationb  CAP, and EPF  Net Transfers 
Net  Grants 
B  of  B  of  % of  Financing  Net  (as a %  as a 5% 
$ Per  National  $ Per  National  $ Per  National  Share  Net  ($ per  of own  of Own 
Capita  Average  Capita  Average  Capita  Average  $ Millionsc  ($ millions)  ($ millions)d  capita)  revenues).  Revenues' 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Newfoundland  2,991  67  4,440  93.5 
Prince Edward Island  3,019  67  4,440  93.5 
Nova Scotia  3,506  78  4,440  93.5 
New Brunswick  3,171  71  4,440  93.5 
Quebec  3,958  88  4,440  93.5 
Ontario  4,761  106  4,761  100 
Manitoba  3,681  82  4,440  93.5 
Saskatchewan  3,970  89  4,440  93.5 
Alberta  5,937  133  5,917  125 
British Columbia  4,840  108  4,840  102 
All provinces  4,478  100  4,751  100 












94  1,196 
94  27 1 
95  1,452 
95  1,426 
96  8,377 
99  5,863 
94  1,526 
94  1,011 
122  1,586 
102  2,081 























































Source; Reproduced from Courchene 1994, table 17; author's calculations. 
aRevenues from representative tax bases at national average tax rates-that  is, fiscal capacity. 
%4,440 is the five-province standard. 
'Equalization plus CAP plus the cash components of EPF (plus the tax abatements for Quebec) 
"The shares of federal taxes by province appear in Courchene 1994, chapter 2,  note 3. 
'Column  10 5  column I. 
'(Column 5 -  column 1)  column  I. 311  Subnational Budgetary Policies 
not differ. The first point to note is that standardized own revenues (i.e., at 
comparable tax rates and standardized tax bases) are considerably more vari- 
able across the Canadian provinces. From table 12.5, standardized own reve- 
nues for Alberta are twice that of  Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island 
(i.e., the high/low ratio is 1.99, from the last row), whereas Western Australia’s 
own revenues are only 1.5 times that of  Tasmania. Second, on average, own 
revenues for the Canadian provinces are well in excess of those for the Austra- 
lian states ($4,478 from the second to last entry in column l of table 12.5 vs. 
$1,689 from the “Australian Standard” row  of column 1 in table 12.4). This 
follows directly from the earlier data on the allocation of tax sources: there is 
simply no scope for the Australian states to raise anywhere near the own- 
source revenues of the Canadian provinces. While Commonwealth-state  trans- 
fers as a percentage of own-source revenues are, as elaborated below, much 
higher than federal-provincial transfers, it is still the case that, after transfers, 
the  provinces’ revenues  significantly exceed  those  of  the Australian states 
($5,397 vs. $3,479, from the last entries of column 5 in both tables). Much of 
this relates to the allocation of expenditure functions-for  example, welfare is 
a provincial matter in Canada but a Commonwealth responsibility in Australia. 
Some also reflects the fact that, as a percentage of GDP, Australian taxes over- 
all are much lower than Canadian taxes. 
One measure of the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance appears in column 6 
of  table 12.4 for Australia and in the last column of  table 12.5 for Canada. 
At the all-province level, federal-provincial transfers represent 21 percent of 
standardized own revenues in Canada, while Commonwealth-state  grants actu- 
ally exceed average own revenues-grants  are  106 percent of  standardized 
own revenues. The most fiscally autonomous state in Australia (New South 
Wales, with a grants-to-own-source-revenues  percentage of 90 percent) is far 
more grant-dependent than any Canadian province. The Canadian ratios range 
from a high of 70 percent for Newfoundland to 11 percent, 12 percent, and 13 
percent for Alberta, Ontario, and British Columbia, the three “have” (or non- 
equalization-receiving) provinces. Indeed, in the fiscal year 1996/97,  Alberta’s 
budget surplus was well in excess of  all transfers from Ottawa, so that this 
province’s own revenues exceeded its total expenditure. And Alberta has by far 
the lowest tax effort of  all the provinces. Thus, Alberta is fully autonomous 
fiscally! 
12.2.3  Conditional versus Unconditional Grants 
Given the centralist and egalitarian features of the Australian federation, it 
should follow that the Commonwealth grants to the states should be tilted in 
the direction of conditional or specific-purpose payments (SPPs). From col- 
umns 3 and 4 of table 12.4, this is precisely the case-specific-purpose  trans- 
fers exceed general-purpose transfers ($943 per capita vs. $847 per capita). 
What is not shown in table 12.4 is that SPPs have been increasing relative to 
unconditional grants. The situation in Canada is precisely the reverse. With the 312  Thomas J. Courchene 
recent move to “block funding” of federal transfers relating to health, postsec- 
ondary education, and welfare in the form of the CHST (Canada Health and 
Social Transfer), there remain no specific-purpose transfers in the Canadian 
federation. To be sure, all provincial monies spent on health must abide by 
five principles (universality, accessibility, comprehensiveness, portability, and 
public administration). However, these principles relate more to the require- 
ments of an “internal social union” than to conditions on the transfers them- 
selves. 
Australia may well be unique among modern federations in terms of having 
its intergovernmental grants gradually shift from general purpose to specific 
purpose  or from an  unconditional  to a conditional  basis.  Indeed, even the 
general-purpose grants that fall under the rubric of the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission (CGC) are not as unconditional as they might appear. This is be- 
cause one of the determinants of the CGC grants is “expenditure disabilities.” 
If there is a greater expenditure “need” in a given state, it will receive a larger 
share of the grant for that specific expenditure purpose. What appears to be 
occurring is that special interests are increasingly aware of this and are pressur- 
ing the states to spend these monies more in accordance with the associated 
expenditure needs. And if the special interests fail in this endeavor to bring the 
states in line,  they  can then  lobby Canberra to remove this category  from 
general-purpose grants and to convert it to a specific-purpose grant. This is 
part of the dynamic in favor of tied grants in Australia, and without access to 
broad-based taxation the states are rather helpless to combat this dynamic. In 
this sense, the core problem relates to the enormous degree of  vertical fiscal 
imbalance. Hence Australian policy analysts desirous of enhancing state auton- 
omy are, not surprisingly, focusing on creative approaches to significantly en- 
hancing the states’ taxation powers and, therefore, fiscal autonomy (e.g., Walsh 
1996).  In line with the earlier analysis, these efforts will probably not succeed 
unless the Commonwealth alters its centralisdegalitarian philosophy. Now that 
we have broached the operations of the CGC, it is appropriate to focus on this 
celebrated institution in more detail and to compare it with Canada’s equaliza- 
tion program. To  anticipate the analysis, nowhere is Australian egalitarianism 
more evident than in its approach to these CGC “equalization payments.” 
12.2.4  Equalization 
By way of an introductory set of comments on revenue equalization in Can- 
ada and Australia, the first point to note is that the CGC approach (which re- 
lates to General Revenue Grants, not specific-purpose payments although, as 
noted later, some of the SPP’s are indirectly taken into account in the CGC 
calculations) combines both  vertical and horizontal  balance considerations, 
whereas the Canadian equalization program is concerned only with horizontal 
balance (i.e., only seven of the ten provinces qualify for equalization). Second, 
the CGC model equalizes for both “revenue means” and “expenditure needs,” 
whereas the Canadian model is limited to ensuring that all provinces have ac- 313  Subnational Budgetary Policies 
cess to some “standard level” of per capita revenues (currently a “five-province 
standard,” where the five provinces in the standard are Ontario, British Colum- 
bia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Quebec). Third, Canadian provinces with 
per capita revenues in excess of this five-province standard level of per capita 
revenues keep their excess revenue. In other words, rich provinces are not “lev- 
eled down.”  Because the CGC model integrates both vertical and horizontal 
transfers, there are no “tall poppies”-Australian  states are fully leveled, both 
up and down. Finally, the CGC model only determines the states’ “shares” or 
the “relativities” with respect to the overall general-revenue grant. The Com- 
monwealth government determines the amount to be distributed. This differs 
from the Canadian equalization formula, which simultaneously determines the 
distribution and the magnitude of the payments, except when ceilings and/or 
floors apply, as they have on occasion over the past decade. 
The CGC Model 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission model is a computational night- 
mare in the sense that it equalizes across 19 categories on the revenue side and 
40 on the expenditure side. Having spent months wrestling with the mechanics 
and mathematics of the CGC model, I have come to the conclusion that what- 
ever the merits of the CGC (and there are many-its  independence, its accessi- 
bility, its competence) one of  them is not its expositional ability. Thankfully, 
there is a much more intuitive approach to the CGC model, one employed in 
the article Horizontal Fiscal Equalization, the Report of the Heads of Treasur- 
ies Working Party to the 1994 Premiers’ Conference (1994). Essentially the 
grants to each state can be expressed as 
an equal per capita share of the total revenue grant; 
plus revenue needs  [RJP, (1 -  p)],  where revenue-rich states @,  > 1.0) 
will be leveled down from the standardized per capita revenue (Rs/Ps),  and 
vice versa; 
plus expenditure needs [Es/Ps(y,  -  l)], where “needy” states (y, > 1.0) will 
receive a larger share of  the standardized expenditures (EJPJ, and vice 
versa; 
minus the excess of those Specific Purpose Payments that are included in the 
analysis (and not all of them are) in relation to the amounts that the CGC 
model would call for.“ 
This approach is applied in table  12.6 for 1993/94. Column  1 contains the 
equal per capita value of  the grant, which is $980 (i.e., the $17,400 million 
figure in column 7 divided by total population). Column 2 corrects for revenue 
4.  Some but not all SPPs are integrated into the CGC model. If the amount of these SPPs across 
states is in excess of  what would result if these SPPs were allocated on the basis of  the CGC’s 
approach to expenditure need, then the excess (deficiency) is subtracted (added) in order to deter- 
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Sources: Report of the Heads of Treasuries 1994, table 2.1  for first six columns. Distribution in column 8 is taken from table 2 of Brosio 1994. Author's calculations for the remainder. 
"Negative revenue needs mean above-average revenue-raising capacity, and vice versa. 
bNegative expenditure needs means below average expenditure requirements. and vice versa. 
'Negative adjustment means above-average receipt of relevant payments. 
These relativities differ slightly from the Premiers'  Conference relativities due to a minor technical adjustment. 
This  column allocates the grants according to the distribution by state of the source of Commonwealth revenues 315  Subnational Budgetary Policies 
needs, that is, New South Wales loses $91 per capita because it is revenue rich, 
and so on. Column 3 corrects for expenditure needs. Victoria and the Austra- 
lian Capital Territory are the big losers here since, they are in effect, deemed 
less “needy” than the remaining states. Column 4 adjusts for those SPPs that 
are included in the CGC model. The per capita entitlements appear in column 
5 and the resulting relativities in column 6. Note that the net adjustment in 
each of columns 2,3,  and 4 is zero, so that the overall $980 per capita value of 
the average grant is maintained. 
As noted in the introduction to this section, the Australian approach to gen- 
eral revenue assistance embodies both  horizontal and vertical equalization. 
Column 5 of table 12.6 provides a way  of  disentangling, conceptually, these 
two components. The per capita payment for Victoria is the lowest among the 
states, at $818 per capita. One could call this the vertical equalization compo- 
nent of the general revenue grants, that is, the component that all states receive. 
Any  amounts above this $8 18 represent, in effect, horizontal equalization, 
namely payments necessary to bring every state to the Victorian level, as it 
were, that is, to enable other states to provide the average standard of  state- 
type services, assuming they do so at the average level of operational efficiency 
and that they make the average effort to raise revenues from their own sources 
(CGC 1995,51). 
The Analytics of  the Canadian Equalization Formula 
pressed as follows: 
The five-province standard (FPS) Canadian equalization formula can be ex- 
for all j (revenue sources) and all i (provinces), where E, = equalization to 
province i from revenue source j;  P, = population of province i; E,/P, = per 
capita equalization to province i from revenue source  j;  rcl = the national aver- 
age (all-province)  tax rate, defined as total revenues from revenue source j (that 
is, TRJ  divided by  the total base for source (that is, BJ, where subscript c 
refers to Canada or, more correctly, the all-province total; B,IP,  = the per 
capita base for sourcej  in the five-province standard (FPS). The five provinces 
comprising the standard are Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, Manitoba, and 
Saskatchewan. Subscript R refers to the representative five provinces. 
For each of the 33 revenue sources that enter the formula, a common base 
is established and a national average tax rate is calculated. Note that even if a 
province does not tax a given revenue source, it will still be assigned a tax 
base, For example, Alberta has no sales tax, but it obviously does have a sales 
tax base, namely the value of retail sales in the province. Thus, the focus of 
the formula is on equalizing fiscal capacity, not actual revenues. 
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than the average per capita base of the five provinces that make up the standard, 
that is, if  the term in parentheses in equation (1) is positive, the province in 
question will have a positive entitlement for this revenue source and vice versa. 
Entitlements are summed for each province over all revenue sources, and the 
resulting total, if positive, represents the province’s equalization entitlement. If 
the sum is negative, the entitlement is set to zero. That is, rich provinces’ reve- 
nues are nor brought down to the five-province standard (FPS). Indeed, there 
is no transfer of monies between provinces-equalization  payments are made 
from the federal government’s consolidated revenue fund. The seven equaliza- 
tion-receiving provinces are typically referred to as the “have-not provinces,” 
with the remaining three (Alberta, Ontario, and British Columbia) enjoying the 
title of  the  “have  provinces.” Finally, equalization payments  are  uncondi- 
tional-they  can be spent as the receiving provinces wish. 
Equalization in Action: A Comparison 
Equalizing Impact. From column 2 of table 12.5, per capita differences in the 
Canadian provinces standardized own-source revenues range from Newfound- 
land‘s 67 percent of the all-province average to Alberta’s 133 percent. As noted 
beneath the table, the five-province standard for 1991-92  was $4,440 per cap- 
ita. The operations of the equalization formula mean that all provinces with 
less than this per capita revenue level will be brought up to $4,440. The post- 
equalization revenues appear in columns 3 and 4. The higMow ratio falls from 
1.99 pre-equalization (column 2) to 1.34 postequalization (column 4) and fur- 
ther to  1.31 once the vertical transfers (for health, postsecondary education, 
and welfare) are added in. Indeed, were one to remove energy-rich Alberta 
from the comparison, the “relatives” would range from 94 percent of the all- 
province average to 102 percent. Intriguingly, the differences in these per cap- 
ita revenue levels (again excluding Alberta) are not much different from those 
for Australian states, posttransfer, as recorded in column 6 of table 12.4, espe- 
cially if one excludes the Northern Territ~ry.~  However, the differences in per 
capita revenues for Australian states are deliberate and are designed ro  create 
effective equality in providing services. 
One final note in this context. The Canadian data in table  12.5 relate to 
standardized revenues, not actual revenues. Estimates of actual per capita reve- 
nues across provinces for fiscal year  1996-97  reveal that six provinces have 
per capita revenues in excess of  those of Alberta. In other words, Alberta has 
taken out its superior fiscal capacity in terms of a low tax effort (i.e., the lowest 
personal income taxes, no provincial sales tax, etc.). 
5.  Note that the Australian data include the Northern Territories, whereas the Canadian temtor- 
ies (Yukon and the Northwest Territories) are not included in table  12.5, in part because, unlike 
the Northern Territory, their fiscal transfers do not fall under the rubric of the general equalization 
formula. Were one to include them in  the analysis they, like the Northern Territory,  would be 
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Net Interstate Distribution. The last four columns of table 12.6 focus on the 
net interstate redistribution as a result of the operations of the CGC. The dollar 
values of  the CGC grants by  state appear in column 7. The resulting total 
($17.4 billion) is then reallocated across states in accordance with the source 
of  Commonwealth revenues. Thus, Victoria receives $3.658 billion in CGC 
grants, but its citizens’ share of  financing the overall grant would be $4.905 
billion; that is, it contributes $1.247 billion net (or $279 per capita) to the fi- 
nancing of the general-purpose revenues. This amounts to over one-third of its 
actual CGC grant. 
Columns 7 through 11 of table 12.5 repeat this exercise for Canadian trans- 
fers. From column 7, Ontario receives $5.8 billion in transfers, but its citizens’ 
share of Ottawa’s consolidated revenue to pay for the transfers is $10.8 billion, 
for a net contribution of $5.015 billion or nearly 90 percent of its own transfer. 
But this is not the identical exercise as in table 12.5, because Ontario also gets 
to keep its tax revenues in excess of the five-province average level. Nonethe- 
less, these data help clarify the actual degree of interprovincial redistribution. 
For example, overall grants to Quebec equal 31 percent of its own revenues 
(column 11). But when one takes into account who pays for these transfers, the 
net transfer to Quebec as a percentage of its own revenues is 11 percent (col- 
umn 10). Even on this net basis, transfers remain high for some provinces- 
5 1 percent of own revenues for Newfoundland and 48 percent for Prince Ed- 
ward Island. 
Stabilizing Features of Equalization:  Canada. Under the Canadian equaliza- 
tion system, a have-not province is guaranteed the average per capita revenue 
of  the five provinces that make up the equalization standard. Thus, if  the tax 
bases collapse in a have-not province that is not included in the five-province 
standard because, say, of an asymmetric negative shock, its revenue level will 
be unafected. This is 100 percent stabilization, as it were. This result is sym- 
metric, in the sense that equalization will “confiscate” any revenues arising 
from an increase in these provinces’ tax bases. That this is the case is obvious 
from equation (1) above, because the fall in B,/P, does not affect BRj/PR  for 
those provinces that are outside the five-province standard.6  For have-not prov- 
inces that are part of the standard, the offset is not complete because any fall 
in that province’s tax base will also reduce the five-province standard. Assume 
that Quebec has a 30 percent weight in the five-province standard. If Quebec’s 
tax bases were to fall by  10 percent, the five-province standard would fall by 3 
percent and Quebec’s total revenues would accordingly fall by  3 percent (as 
would the equalization for all other have-not provinces). 
On the other hand, the three “have” provinces receive no insulation on either 
6.  For a detailed discussion of the analytics of the Canadian equalization formula, readers can 
consult Boadway and Hobson 1993 or Courchene and Wildasin 1984. 318  Thomas J. Courchene 
the up or down side. If Alberta suffers a 10 percent fall in its tax bases, then 
its revenues fall by  10 percent and vice versa. The same applies for Ontario 
and British Columbia, with one important proviso-their  tax bases enter the 
five-province standard. With its 50 percent weight in the FPS, a 10 percent in- 
crease in Ontario’s tax bases implies a 5 percent increase in the level of the five- 
province standard for all have-not provinces. In the last half of the 1980s, the 
Ontario economic boom meant a rapidly rising FPS, so much so that the ceiling 
provisions of the equalization program came into play. And the dramatic col- 
lapse in Ontario’s revenues in the  1990s recession  served to lower the five- 
province standard, so that the “floor” provisions of  the equalization formula 
came into play. 
Therefore, in terms of  stabilization properties,  Canada’s equalization pro- 
gram has, at one extreme, zero stabilization for the three “rich” provinces, and, 
at the other, full (100 percent) stabilization for the four have-not provinces 
outside the FPS, with the remaining  three provinces occupying the middle 
ground. 
Two  final  comments  are  in  order.  First,  have-not  provinces  can  gain, 
revenue-wise, from an increase in their tax rates. But this is not a realistic 
alternative in the current environment where all the pressures are in the direc- 
tion of tax cuts, not tax increases, and this applies with even more force in 
have-not provinces, which tend to already have higher-than-average tax rates. 
The second point is that the equalization schemes are, on balance, probably 
more redistributive than stabilizing. Because Ontario has a 50 percent weight 
in the five-province standard, the equalization payments received by Nova Sco- 
tia depend as much, if not more, on what happens in Ontario as in Nova Scotia. 
For example, Nova Scotia’s GDP need not be deviating from a trend line (i.e., 
no stabilization problem, per se) yet its equalization could still increase if On- 
tario’s tax revenues are revving upward and vice versa. That many of the so- 
called stabilization programs in federal nations embody substantial redistribu- 
tion is a key theme in Goodhart and Smith 1993. 
Both these final two comments also apply to the CGC model, to which I 
now turn. 
Stabilizing Features of Equalization: Australia. The CGC model has potential 
stabilizing features since the total amount to be equalized is set annually by 
the Commonwealth. On a timely basis, this could be increased in a recession 
and vice versa. But this would apply to all states in accordance with the ex- 
isting “relativities”: on an immediate basis, it cannot be targeted to a state with 
a negative economic shock because the CGC approach employs a five-year 
average, lagged three years. 
More generally, the Australian states are severely revenue constrained: they 
cannot pocket the proceeds of  an economic boom (except for the initial three 
years before their newfound fortune becomes reflected in the revised relativi- 
ties). To see this, consider the following example, drawn from the early 1990s. 319  Subnational Budgetary Policies 
Western Australia received a $750 million Commonwealth transfer relating to 
offshore energy initiatives. Apart from the initial three years, this will enter 
WA’s relativities and WA  may not even retain its population share of this reve- 
nue. This will depend on the relevant revenue and expenditure relativities. And 
if the Commonwealth holds overall revenue transfers constant, WA  will experi- 
ence a sharp fall in its transfers, offset by increases in all other states. Whether 
this results in a confiscatory drop in transfers will, as noted, depend on WAS 
relativities. Were this revenue windfall to occur in Alberta, the province would 
pocket a21  of  it. Since Alberta is not part of the FPS, there would be no impact 
on equalization in other provinces. Were British Columbia the recipient prov- 
ince, it also would pocket all of this windfall, but since the FPS would rise as 
a result (since British Columbia is part of the FPS), all other provinces would 
stand to have their equalization increased somewhat, financed from Ottawa’s 
consolidated revenues. 
At this juncture, it is important to raise an important issue. Whatever philos- 
ophy is behind these equalization programs, they have  a common defect- 
there is precious little revenue incentive for Australian states and Canadian 
“have-not”  provinces  to  implement  policies  that  ensure  state/provincial 
growth. As already noted, a revenue increase resulting from growing tax bases 
for poor provinces outside the FPS in Canada is fully confiscated by the Cana- 
dian equalization formula. And this confiscation is presumably high as well for 
all Australian states. While there are admittedly other rationales for states and 
provinces to embark on growth-producing policies, the incentives in the equal- 
ization formula are, nonetheless, perverse. 
12.2.5  Regional Disparities 
Two final issues merit attention in preparing the ground for a focus on subna- 
tional budgetary policies and institutions. Since they are drawn from the ex- 
isting literature, the analysis will be brief. 
The first is that  per capita regional  income (GDP) disparities are much 
higher across Canadian provinces than across Australian states (Courchene 
1993a, 1996a). With Victoria on the high end (for 1991) and Tasmania on the 
low end, the highnow ratio for the Australian state is 1.30, or 130 percent. For 
the Canadian provinces, the corresponding 1991 highnow ratio is 1.79, or 179 
percent (with Alberta on the high end and Newfoundland and Prince Edward 
Island essentially tied for the low end). Were one to replace Alberta with On- 
tario, the higldlow ratio would still be above 170 percent. The ratio of employ- 
ment to the labor force (i.e., unity minus the unemployment rate) reveals an 
even greater disparity-a  highnow ratio for the Australian states of 1.03 com- 
pared with 1.13 for the Canadian provinces, or four times as disparate for Can- 
ada. These results should come as no surprise. With wage grids roughly identi- 
cal across states, with automatic stabilizers (e.g., welfare) located at the center, 
and with full fiscal leveling, there is nowhere near the scope in Australia for 
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these provinces’ revenues and for them to become capitalized in wages and 
rents. 
However, were one to focus on personal income per capita (as distinct from 
GDP per capita) the variation in the degree of regional disparity is substantially 
reduced-1.21  for the Australian higMow ratio across states and 1.30 across 
the Canadian provinces. What this means is that Canada has a (relatively) more 
generous set of federal transfers to individuals, particularly to individuals in 
the poorer provinces. Much of  this relates to the operations of  the Canadian 
unemployment insurance program-eligibility  criteria are tilted toward poorer 
regions, as are the duration of benefits. (Australia does not even have an unem- 
ployment  insurance  program.)  Indeed, Canada’s interpersonal  transfers  are 
such that, for Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, personal income actu- 
ally exceeds provincial GDP in 1991. For no Australian state is this even close 
to being the case. 
This leads to an important observation. Just as the Canadian provinces have 
more effective powers than the Australian states, so too does Ottawa have more 
maneuverability than Canberra. Except for the Commonwealth’s free reign on 
designing transfers to the states (section 96), the Commonwealth is prohibited 
from discriminating in favor of particular states in its other policies. There is 
no similar provision in the Canadian Constitution, and Ottawa is notorious for 
building regional preferences into programs other than equalization. Indeed, at 
one point in the recent past, investment incentives in national income taxation 
were tilted in favor of  have-not provinces. One result of  the proliferation of 
federal policies (replete with perverse incentives) designed to combat Cana- 
dian regional disparities is that these disparities have become long-standing 
and entrenched. Elsewhere (1  993b and 1994)  I have referred to this as “transfer 
dependency” or a “policy-induced equilibrium.” At the analytical level, one 
could probably make the case that these Canadian initiatives at the regional 
level are rather inevitable. While the Canadian federation is not structured to 
deliver an Australian type of  egalitarianism, the Canadian Constitution does 
commit governments to “promote equal opportunities for the well-being of all 
Canadians” (s.36( l)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1982). Since equal opportunity 
is deemed not to arise out of the interplay of market forces (as evidenced by 
the degree of provincial per capita disparities in GDP), it falls on the federal 
government to become an active regional player in programs beyond the formal 
equalization program. Indeed, Ottawa is finding itself more and more driven to 
regionally redistributive roles. On the other hand, Canberra is able (and, actu- 
ally, constitutionally bound) to play a regionally neutral role in delivering na- 
tional programs. This poses no particular challenge to the Australian egalitari- 
anism, since the concerns relating to individual and state equity/equality are 
accommodated within the confines of the operations of fiscal federalism and 
the centralized nature of the federation. 
With this admittedly lengthy constitutionaVinstitutionaVempirica1  backdrop, 
we now direct attention to the frameworks within which the Australia states 
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the ensuing analysis, it should come as no surprise that the Australia case is a 
model of coordination and harmonization, while the Canadian case is neither 
and, in some aspects, actually borders on the dysfunctional. 
12.3  Commonwealth-State  Fiscal Coordination in Australia 
12.3.1  The Original Commonwealth Loan Council (CLC) 
In 1927, the Commonwealth and the governments of the six states entered 
into a Financial Agreement to coordinate and centralize their borrowings. This 
agreement took effect in  1929. The thrust of  the agreement was as follows 
(Saunders 1990,38-39): 
The Commonwealth would finally use its long-neglected power in Section 
105 of  the Constitution to take over all state debts. The Commonwealth 
would contribute the amount it had previously paid in per capita grants to- 
ward the interest due on the debts for a period of fifty-eight years, which was 
assumed to be sufficient to amortize them. For the future, a Loan Council, 
representative of  all governments, would be established to make decisions 
about the terms and levels of borrowings. Most decisions would be by  ma- 
jority, with the Commonwealth having two votes and a casting vote and the 
states one vote each. With a few exceptions all borrowings would be carried 
out by the Commonwealth.  The states would be liable to the Commonwealth 
for interest on the loans and the Commonwealth would be liable to the bond- 
holders. 
The Loan Council has had a very checkered history, important details of which 
appear in  Saunders 1990. Of  interest for present purposes are a few main 
points. First, the role of  the respective governments within the Loan Council 
was a function of the financial resources available to them. This altered dramat- 
ically in  1942 when the Commonwealth assumed sole responsibility for in- 
come taxation. As Saunders (1990,42) notes, “one important result was virtu- 
ally  to  eliminate Commonwealth reliance  on Loan  Council decisions for 
borrowing for its own purposes.” Relatedly, the Commonwealth’s power in the 
Loan Council became preeminent, since the states were wholly dependent on 
revenue transfers from the Commonwealth. 
There was a more serious problem however. There were a set of exemptions 
in the  1929 legislation that allowed the states to utilize semigovernment or 
local government “authorities” to effectively borrow for them, with some of 
the resulting funds appearing in their consolidated revenues. This “end run” 
on the Loan Council eventually reached dramatic proportions. For example, in 
1989-90,  “states or their authorities are expected to borrow $3.7 billion on 
their own behalf, in both domestic and overseas markets. A significant portion 
of these funds will find their way  into state consolidated revenue” (Saunders 
1990,40). Thus, the 1929 version of the Loan Council was essentially in sham- 
bles by  the 1990s. However, the basic principles underlying the council were 
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12.3.2  The Reconstituted Loan Council 
As of  1993, the Loan Council was reconstituted. It now  operates largely 
under voluntarily agreed arrangements rather than the legislated provisions of 
the earlier Financial Agreement. The council is a Commonwealth-State  Minis- 
terial Council comprising the Commonwealth treasurer (as chair) and the pre- 
mier or treasurer of each state, with the Commonwealth  Treasury providing the 
Loan Council Secretariat. The goals of the new council as reflected in Com- 
monwealth Loan Council 1993 are intended to 
facilitate financial market scrutiny of  public-sector finances via better re- 
enhance the role of  the Loan Council as a forum for coordinating public- 
promote greater understanding of budgetary processes 
provide the basis for states and territories assuming greater freedom and re- 
sponsibility in determining their financing requirements consistent with their 
fiscal and debt position and overall macroeconomic constraints 
porting and so make jurisdictions more accountable to the markets 
sector borrowings in light of the discussion of fiscal strategies 
The macro coordination role is a carryover from the old Loan Council. What 
is new is that the states will now  borrow  in their own right rather than via 
the Commonwealth or through their various borrowing authorities. But this 
borrowing will be filtered through the Loan Council process in a way that facil- 
itates transparency, public accountability, and enhanced financial market moni- 
toring. What is not as yet clear is whether the financial markets will view the 
states as “independent” market participants or whether they will assume that 
the Commonwealth, via the Loan Council process, is implicitly or explicitly 
guaranteeing the state debt. (More on this in section 12.7 below.) 
It is too soon to tell whether this new procedure will work, particularly since 
the arrangements are voluntary. In the first couple of years or so, all has worked 
well because the Loan Council has accepted the LCA nominations submitted 
by  the states and because, as will be evident in section 12.6, the Common- 
wealth’s deficit bore the brunt of the 1990s recession. 
I now turn to a brief discussion of the context within which the Loan Council 
and, more generally, Australian fiscal federalism operates. 
12.3.3  The Anatomy of Australian Financial Federalism 
Figure 12.1 presents my interpretation of the anatomy of Australian financial 
federalism. The budget cycle begins with the National Fiscal Outlook. This is 
an overarching document to the entire process of Australian intergovernmental 
financial relations. It presents projections, on a comparable and consistent ba- 
sis, for all governments’ fiscal outlooks for the medium term (i.e., the current 
year and the following three years) under both a high- and low-growth sce- 
nario. The underlying assumption in these forecasts is that the fiscal parameters 323  Subnational Budgetary Policies 
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Fig. 12.1  The anatomy of Australian financial federalism 
remain unchanged over the projection period, including the real value of reve- 
nue assistance from the Commonwealth to the states and territories. Initially, 
these forecasts were provided in advance only to state and territorial govern- 
ments and were made public only at the time of  deliberations of  the Loan 
Council and the Premiers’ Conference. In  1995, however, these projections 
were made public in advance of  the Premiers’ Conference. As an important 
aside, this official public document providing an assessment of  all govern- 
ments’ fiscal stances on a consistent basis does not exist in Canada, although 
some private-sector agents (e.g., the economics department of the Toronto Do- 
minion Bank) have partially filled the gap. 
The National Fiscal Outlook (NFO) feeds into the Commonwealth, state, 324  Thomas J. Courchene 
and territorial Loan Council Nominations (LCAs in figure 12.1). In tandem, 
the NFO and the LCAs provide the public and the financial markets with a 
prebudget overview of the various fiscal positions, which, in turn, enhances the 
transparency and accountability of the overall budgetary process. 
Roughly coincident with the preparation of the National Fiscal Outlook is 
the publication of the Commonwealth Grants Commission “relativities,” that 
is, the stateherritorial shares of Commonwealth grants. These grant relativities 
and the LCAs then feed into the daylong meeting of the Loan Council and the 
Premiers’ Conference. The role of  these meetings is at least threefold: (i) to 
ratify or otherwise reconsider the LCAs; (ii) likewise to ratify or otherwise 
adjust the “relativities” recommended by the Commonwealth Grants Commis- 
sion;  and  (iii)  to  decide  on  the  total  amount of  the  Commonwealth-state 
general-revenue grants, which will then be allocated in line with the shares or 
relativities. These decisions are also released immediately to the public and the 
financial markets. 
Given the grant-dependent nature of the Australian states, as outlined earlier, 
the effective coincidence (i.e., on the same day) of  the decisions relating to 
loan allocations and Commonwealth transfers means that the Commonwealth 
government is clearly in the driver’s seat. For example, one could conceive of 
generous Loan Council allocations along with a curtailment of overall Com- 
monwealth transfers; that is, the Commonwealth could force the states to bor- 
row. There is precious little that the Australian states could do, at least in the 
short term, in response to such a tactic. 
This comment aside, the next stage in the process, in terms of  figure 12.1, 
is the preparation of budgets. Because data on deficit projections  and Loan 
Council allocations are already public, the incentives facing the various gov- 
ernments are clearly to do “better” than this in terms of their bottom line. 
This focus on transparency, on accountability, and on linking overall govern- 
ment deficits to the underlying macro strategy stands in stark contrast to the 
laissez-faire approach in Canada. Even though the reconstituted Loan Council 
arrangements are voluntary, the revenue dependence of the states on the Com- 
monwealth is such that it is highly unlikely that the errant Ontario fiscal sce- 
nario (elaborated later) could ever be replicated in Australia. More generally, 
Australia has in place a fiscal, or at least a borrowing, coordination process 
that appears to ensure that the aggregate fiscal stances are rendered consistent 
with the overall macro strategy. None of this should come as a surprise, given 
the centralist/egalitarian nature of the Australian federation. 
12.4  Federal-Provincial Fiscal Coordination in Canada 
In a word, there is no coordination! Moreover, any monitoring of provincial 
finances is done by the capital markets (bond-rating agencies), not by Ottawa. 
As Kneebone (1994) argues, these capital market constraints were effective (at 
least in the  1980s) in terms of keeping the lid on provincial borrowing, but 
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However, one can report some recent progress in related areas. Canada now 
has a version of a budget cycle. The federal budget comes down in late Febru- 
ary or early March of each year. This fixed date does serve as a harmonization 
element of  sorts in the sense that most provinces will know what Ottawa is 
doing when they present their own budgets. In particular, provinces are obvi- 
ously interested in any changes in federal-provincial transfers, which, except 
for equalization, typically appear in federal budgets. In  addition, federal and 
provincial finance ministers and/or deputies do apparently share basic bud- 
geting information in closed-door meetings prior to the beginning of the bud- 
get cycle. An important initial step in terms of providing greater transparency, 
information, and even potential coordination would be to make these projec- 
tions public ii la Australia’s National Fiscal Outlook. 
Beyond these measures, however, Canada has nothing to compare to the 
Australian institutional process. Phrased differently, the provinces can tax and 
spend as they wish and they can borrow as long as they can find markets for 
their bonds. 
However, the real subnational fiscal story in Canada is the potential conflict 
between provincial and federal policies. I shall focus here only on the province 
of Ontario and deal with three periods within the last decade or so where its 
policies ran fully counter to Ottawa’s fiscal/macro thrust. Then, I shall focus 
on errant behavior by the federal government. 
12.4.1 
To illustrate the problems that can arise in a highly decentralized federation 
with effective fiscal autonomy at both levels of government, it is convenient to 
focus on three recent episodes where the policies of the province of Ontario 
(which has roughly 40 percent of Canada’s GDP) either offset or dramatically 
complicated Ottawa’s macro agenda. 
The first occurred in the mid-1980s when the federal government followed 
the Americans in reducing personal and corporate income tax rates. Ontario 
responded by  “taking up” the vacated federal tax room. That is, it increased its 
provincial income taxes by  the same amount. Overall, taxpayers in Ontario 
were left in a “neutral” position-total  personal income taxes remained con- 
stant, but more now went to Ontario and less to Ottawa. I should note in pass- 
ing that Ontario was not the only province to adopt this strategy. The effect was 
to negate what the federal government was intent on achieving-a  reduction in 
personal income taxation to bring Canada’s tax rates more in line with those in 
the United States, especially since this was the run-up period to the Canada- 
United States Free Trade Agreement. Moreover, the tax break was  intended 
primarily for the footloose manufacturing sector (i.e., for Ontario) in order to 
alleviate the high marginal tax rates on upper-echelon management. But all for 
naught. Essentially, this is the common-property-resource issue in yet another 
guise since both Ottawa and the provinces share the income tax bases. 
The second episode occurred in the latter half of the 1980s. Ontario was in 
the throes of  a very  substantial economic boom. Real GDP growth rates for 
Fiscal Conflict: Ontario versus Ottawa 326  Thomas J. Courchene 
the province averaged over 5 percent annually for the  1984-89  period.  But 
Ontario was also launched on a veritable spending spree. As a result, inflation 
pressures were beginning to emerge in the province. Partly to counter this and 
partly because of a philosophical conversion, the Bank of Canada launched its 
price  stability strategy in early  1988. Yet  Ontario’s spending increases kept 
marching  along  at midteens  growth rates. Given that  Ontario accounts  for 
roughly  40 percent  of  Canada’s GDP, this  severely complicated the price- 
stability strategy. Interest rates and exchange rates soared-for  example, the 
Canada-U.S. exchange rate appreciated from the low 70 cent range in 1986 to 
nearly  90 U.S.  cents per Canadian dollar  in  1991. These rates  were much 
higher than would have been required had Ontario’s fiscal policy been coordi- 
nated with the overall macro strategy. In the event, rough justice prevailed, as 
it were, since Ontario was the principal loser in early 1990s recession. None- 
theless, the lack of policy coordination generated substantial economic costs 
to all Canadians. 
The third episode follows from the second. Thanks to the spending and tax- 
ing spree of the 1980s, Ontario entered 1990 with one of the highest tax rates 
in the country and with a legitimate claim to be the premier social spender at 
the provincial level. Both of these features were wholly out of character for the 
province of Ontario-traditionally  a low-tax and moderate-spending province. 
In any event, the 1990s recession pulled the rug out from under Ontario’s reve- 
nue base. Ontario’s newly elected New Democratic Party (Canada’s version of 
a socialist party) responded by attempting to spend its way out of the recession. 
The result was a $10 billion budget deficit for Ontario for the fiscal year 1990- 
91, compared to budget balance in  1988, for example. And not once in the 
five-year mandate of the New Democrats did Ontario’s deficit fall beneath $10 
billion. From a net public debt level of just over $40 billion in fiscal 1990-91, 
Ontario’s debt  mushroomed  to  $99 billion  in  fiscal  1995-96-an  increase 
of  nearly  150 percent. During this same period, the federal government was 
launched on a determined deficit-reduction course, which was obviously and 
seriously compromised by  Ontario’s deficit spending. Although Canada’s in- 
flation rate was running below that in the United States, our nominal interest 
rates and, therefore, our real interest rates were well above comparable U.S. 
rates. We only achieved the interest-rate “crossover” (i.e., Canadian nominal 
rates for short- and medium-term maturities below U.S. nominal rates) once 
the new Conservative government in Ontario (elected in 1995) committed the 
province to budget balance by the end of the century. 
Several implications arising from Ontario’s debt run-up merit highlighting. 
The first relates to severity of the early 1990s recession for Ontario. The reve- 
nue collapse was such that it would have been impossible to keep the province 
out of the red. The New Democrats may have thrown fiscal caution to the 
winds, but achieving budget balance, at least in  the first year or two of the 
recession, would have required draconian measures. The second is related. Be- 
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the recession), it has no equalization “safety net” underpinning its revenue 
base. Third, Ontario entered this period in rather enviable fiscal shape. Its bud- 
get was balanced in 1988-89  (table 12.7), and its debt-to-GDP ratio was less 
than 15 percent. (Only British Columbia had a lower debt/GDP ratio in this 
era.) Indeed, as late as 1990 Ontario had a (Standard and Poor’s) AAA rating. 
Therefore, Ontario had ready access to capital markets, at least initially. How- 
ever, it did not take long for the capital markets to react. Standard and Poor’s 
dropped Ontario’s rating to AA+ in 1991, to AA in  1992, and then to AA- 
in  1993, where it still remains. Nonetheless, the province was able to float 
roughly $60 billion in new bonds over a five-year period-undoubtedly  a re- 
cord for a subnational government, anywhere, anytime. 
The fourth point situates Ontario’s behavior in the EU context. As I have 
argued elsewhere (1993b), the challenge to coordinated macro policy in either 
Canada or the EU is not likely to come from the smaller provinces or countries. 
In part, this is precisely because they are small and, hence, likely to have mini- 
mum impact on the overall stabilization strategy: errant behavior by  Portugal 
or Newfoundland will have little effect on EU or Canadian inflation targets. In 
part, also, the capital markets will tend to keep these countries or provinces in 
check. On both counts, this is less likely to apply to the powerful nations or 
provinces. For example, in the second of the above two episodes, Ontario was 
well within any sort of Maastricht-type guidelines. In terms of the 1990s, how- 
ever, Ontario’s deficit-to-GDP  ratio did exceed 3 percent from 1991-92  onward 
(3.9 percent in 1991-92,  4.4 percent in 1992-93,  3.9 percent in 1993-94,  3.3 
percent in  1994-95,  dropping finally to 2.8 percent in  1995-96),  while the 
debt/GDP ratio increased from  14.2 percent in  1989-90  to 31.3 percent in 
1995-96. The point I am making here is that large countries in the EU that are 
“intramarginal” in terms of  the Maastricht guidelines are far more likely to 
wreak havoc with overall macro and inflation guidelines than are some of the 
smaller and likely capital-markets-constrained countries who are likely to be 
bumping against the Maastricht guidelines in any event. 
The key message in the Canadian case is that the federation is in dire need 
of some coordinating, perhaps even harmonizing, mechanisms that would ad- 
dress the deleterious spillovers arising from fiscal and budgetary decentraliza- 
tion. Note that this is not meant to downplay the potential for stabilization 
policies at the provincial level, especially for the three have provinces. In par- 
ticular, there is an important provincial role in terms of “tempering” their eco- 
nomic booms. 
12.4.2  Fiscal Conflict: Ottawa versus the Provinces 
While Canada’s taxation system is very decentralized, it is at the same time 
quite harmonized. The decentralized personal income tax allows the provinces 
(except for Quebec, which has its own personal income tax) to levy a single 
tax rate against federal taxes payable. For example, a 50 percent provincial tax 
rate would imply that the province in question would receive one-third of over- Table 12.7  Canadian Federal and Provincial Governments: Surpluses and Deficits (as of July 21,1997) 
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all personal income tax revenues. The overall tax is harmonized because the 
federal government determines all the relevant parameters (definitions of in- 
come, definitions of tax credits, overall progressivity, etc.) and because the tax 
compliance for the provincial portion of the tax is minimal (the provincial tax 
component occupies only a line or two in the overall tax form). While the 
harmonization of the personal income tax remains, Ottawa introduced a 7 per- 
cent European-style VAT (the goods and services tax, GST) beginning in 199  1. 
This replaced the former manufacturers’ sales tax. The rationale for the switch 
is not in question. The GST, like any VAT, is export-import neutral and, there- 
fore, ideally designed for the enhanced U.S. and North American integration 
under the FTA and NAFTA. Unfortunately, this tax was introduced in the face 
of  almost  universal  opposition  from  the  provinces.  Initially, only  Quebec 
agreed to harmonize its PST (provincial sales tax) with the GST base (and was 
rewarded with the power to collect both the GST and its harmonized PST). For 
the nine other provinces (actually eight, since Alberta does not levy a PST), 
the tax bases of the GST and the PST are very different. In particular, the PSTs 
generally exclude services. This has introduced a very substantial compliance 
cost on businesses and, generally, has led to a sales tax “jungle,” as it were. As 
of April 1, 1997, Ottawa offered a $1 billion dollar bribe to three Atlantic prov- 
inces (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland) to adopt a “blended” 
(GST plus PST) sales tax at a combined rate of  15 percent. This billion-dollar 
subsidy has not been well received by the other provinces (who were not of- 
fered the subsidy), and the sales tax disharmony still prevails in these other 
provinces. Whatever  the  problems  and  challenges  of  Commonwealth-state 
fiscal relations in Australia, this degree of lack of harmonization could never 
occur. 
The other, and more far-reaching, federal-provincial dysfunction is that the 
Canadian  federal  government  has  achieved  its  quite  remarkable  deficit- 
turnaround by  “off-loading” or “deficit shifting” much of its problem to the 
provinces. This issue will be addressed in the context of Canada’s recent fiscal 
history, to which I now turn. 
12.5  Recent Fiscal History: Canada 
Canada came out of the severe 1990s recession in absolutely dreadful fiscal 
shape.’ In fiscal year 1992-93, the federal deficit was $41.0 billion (5.9 percent 
of GDP) and the combined (federal and provincial) deficit was $65.9 billion 
(9.6 percent of GDP), as revealed in table 12.7. Federal net public debt was 
$466 billion (68 percent of GDP) and the combined federal and provincial debt 
was $660 billion, or 95.7 percent of GDP. Beyond this, our current account 
deficit was running at 4 percent of GDP. Spilling this amount of red ink was 
tantamount to an open invitation to what we Canadians call the “kids in red 
7. For a longer sweep of Canada’s macro history, see Courchene 1997. 331  Subnational Budgetary Policies 
suspenders” (the international capital markets) to exert some external pressure 
on our fiscal profligacy. And they did, not only by downgrading Canada’s for- 
eign currency debt (which as a percentage of GDP was well above any other 
G7 nation) but also by providing an external discipline that in turn provided 
the needed  catalyst for bringing  Canadians to their fiscal  senses. The fiscal 
story from 1993, and especially  1995, to the present is one of a quite remark- 
able turnaround: in 1998 Ottawa is forecast (by Finance Canada) to be the only 
G7 nation to run a financial requirements surplus. What follows is a brief sur- 
vey of the key elements of this turnaround. 
12.5.1  Inflation, Interest Rates, and Exchange Rates 
In 1988 the Bank of Canada adopted a price stability strategy. The immedi- 
ate result of this was that interest rates spiraled upward, the Canadian dollar 
appreciated from the low 70 cent range to nearly 90 U.S. cents in 1991, and 
Canadian competitiveness vis-a-vis the United States (as measured by compar- 
ative unit labor costs expressed in a common currency) deteriorated  sharply, 
all of which exacerbated the early 1990s recession. 
Nonetheless,  the price  stability policy did  achieve its intended  results by 
early 1992, when Canadian inflation rates dipped below U.S. inflation rates, 
where they have stayed ever since. And the exchange rate fell back to the low 
70 cent range. The problem,  however,  was that  until  early 1996, Canadian 
short-term nominal rates remained above, often well above, comparable U.S. 
rates with the result that Canadian real interest rates were well in excess (often 
by 4 percent) of U.S. real rates. It was not until early 1996 that Canadian trea- 
sury bill rates dipped below comparable U.S. T-bill rates, and it was not until 
early 1997 that Canadian interest rates were below comparable U.S. rates up 
to a maturity of 10 years. This “interest-rate crossover” is a historic develop- 
ment and clearly a feather in the Bank of Canada’s cap.* While not downplay- 
ing the role that the Bank of  Canada’s credibility played in this interest-rate 
crossover, it is nonetheless the case that the Bank probably needed the commit- 
ment to deficit reduction  and the budget  credibility  of  the finance minister. 
Moreover, it probably also needed the newly elected (1995) Conservative gov- 
ernment of  Ontario to ride herd  on the province’s five-year average of  $10 
billion-plus annual deficits. 
At the time of writing, interest rates are at 30- or 40-year lows, inflation 
remains roughly at the midpoint of the 1-3  percent target range and lower than 
U.S. inflation, the Canadian economy is probably as competitive vis-8-vis the 
8. Elsewhere (1997), I expressed some pessimism in terms of  Canada’s (and the bank‘s) ability 
to generate this interest-rate crossover. Obviously, I was wrong. However, the larger point relates 
to the wisdom of  pursuing a lower inflation rate than the Americans, when 80 percent of exports 
are destined for US.  markets. Canada cannot tolerate the massive exchange rate swings of the last 
decade (70 U.S.  cents per Canadian dollar in 1986, roughly 90 cents in 1991, and back to the low 
70 cent range recently). What may guarantee more exchange-rate fixity is that the  U.S. Federal 
Reserve is also targeting on a low inflation rate. While others (e.g., Fortin 1996) are also concerned 
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Americans as it has ever been, the merchandise trade  surplus is running at 
nearly 5 percent of GDP, and the current account is balanced. Fiscal policy is 
an integral part of this impressive turnaround. 
12.5.2  The Fiscal Story 
The Chrktien Liberals were elected in 1993 on a platform that included, B la 
Maastricht, bringing the federal deficit down to 3 percent of  GDP. However, 
Finance Minister Paul Martin, pressured by domestic and international finan- 
cial markets and the Canadian economics policy community, buoyed by sub- 
stantial citizen support, and chastened with the reality that debt-servicing costs 
were running at 33 percent of revenues (in fiscal year 1993-94), utilized this 
Maastricht window to pursue a much more thorough exercise in fiscal restraint. 
The key fiscal blueprint was the 1995 federal budget. This budget trimmed the 
federal civil service by 45,000 persons (25 percent), generated major cuts to 
program spending (especially federal-provincial transfers), led to the passing 
down of many areas to the provinces (mining, forestry, tourism, training, etc.), 
and extricated the federal government from a wide range of  areas (privatiza- 
tion, contracting out, desubsidization, etc.). 
Almost  as important  as the  budget  content  was  the  budgetary  process 
adopted by Finance Minister Paul Martin. Apart from opening up the process, 
these initiatives included 
Setting rolling targets for only two years in the future, but ensuring that these 
targets would be met. For example, the deficit target for 1995-96 was set for 
$32.7 billion and that for  1996-97  for $24.3 billion  (3 percent  of  GDP). 
Actual deficits came in much under target-under  $30 billion for 1995-96 
and an estimated $15 billion for 1996-97  (table 12.7). The new targets are 
$17 billion (2 percent of GDP) for 1997-98 and $9 billion (1 percent of GDP 
for 1998-99).  These targets will be met “come hell or high water,” to quote 
from the  1997 budget, and virtually all analysts would agree. Indeed, the 
1996-97  deficit is already under the 1997-98  target. 
To ensure that the targets are met, the finance minister has adopted deliber- 
ately “prudent” estimates for forecasts of variables like GDP growth and in- 
terest rates. For example, the average of private-sector forecasts of nominal 
GDP growth for 1998 is 4.7 percent. The budget forecasts assume a 4.1 per- 
cent growth rate. And the average private-sector forecast for ten-year govern- 
ment bonds is 6.6 percent, whereas the budget forecast uses 7.1 percent. 
In addition, Finance Minister Martin’s deficit targets also include a contin- 
gency reserve ($3.0 billion for 1997-98), which cannot be spent elsewhere. 
For 1997-98,  the impact of this contingency reserve is such that the deficit 
target will be met “even if  interest rates were 100 basis points higher, and 
growth one-half percentage point lower, relative to the prudent assumptions” 
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The result of  all of  this is that the finance minister and his budgets have ac- 
quired a degree of credibility hitherto unknown in Canadian fiscal circles. 
Prior to focusing on a few performance indicators, it is critical for purposes 
of  the present paper to note that much of  the successful federal expenditure 
restraint came at the expense of the provinces: Ottawa took a page out of the 
Australian hymn book and engaged in significant “deficit-shifting” or offload- 
ing to the provinces. The equalization system was untouched, but the cash trans- 
fers for health, postsecondary education, and welfare (now rolled into the block- 
funded CHST) were reduced from $18 billion in  1995-96  to (a projected) 
$11 billion at the turn of  the century. This represents, roughly, a 40 percent 
cut in CHST cash transfers to the provinces. 
For their part, the provinces found themselves with little room to maneuver. 
The bond  rating agencies were poised to lower credit ratings further if  the 
provinces attempted to accommodate this dramatic cash transfer reduction in 
terms of  deficit increases. Since provincial tax rates were already very high, 
this avenue was effectively closed off. Moreover, the citizen concern over defi- 
cits that led to the general acceptance of  federal fiscal constraint also applied 
at the provincial level. Accordingly, these federal cash transfer cuts to the prov- 
inces were transformed into roughly equivalent expenditure reductions at the 
provincial level. 
Ontario is especially interesting in this context. The new market-oriented 
Progressive  Conservative  government  of  Ontario  (elected  in  mid- 1995) 
launched the province on both a tax-cutting and deficit-reducing strategy. On- 
tario’s personal income tax rates have been reduced by 30 percent and the bud- 
get is to be balanced by the millennium. Ontario also adopted the federal bud- 
geting strategy-very  conservative incomehevenue growth estimates for its 
forecasts and a large contingency reserve. As a result, Ontario’s deficit has also 
come in “under forecast,” as it were, so that Ontario’s budgetary policy is also 
acquiring considerable credibility. Intriguingly, this approach carried over to 
the other fiscally errant province-Quebec.  Faced with an Ontario tax cut, the 
separatist Parti-Qubbbcois government in Quebec also had to begin the process 
of  sharp expenditure reduction rather than tax increases. Moving on the tax 
side would have led to a (further) exodus of  Quebec businesses to Ontario or 
elsewhere. 
The result of  all of  this was  that all Canadian governments are currently 
moving quickly toward budget balance. As already noted, Ottawa’s deficit for 
1996-97 will probably come in at less than 2 percent of GDP, down from 6.5 
percent earlier in the decade. Table 12.7 presents the evolution of federal and 
provincial deficits from fiscal year 1989-90 through to (forecasts for) 1998-99. 
Several features of the table merit highlight: 
Both levels of government recorded very  substantial increases in their defi- 
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$4.3 billion  in 1989-90  to $24.9 billion at the peak of  the fiscal damage 
(1992-93),  while the federal government’s deficit increased from $28.9 bil- 
lion to $41.0 billion over this same period (and actually increased further 
in 1993-94). 
Unlike the Australian case (detailed later) where the 1990s recession primar- 
ily affected the Commonwealth deficit, the Canadian provinces have shared 
roughly equally in the Canadian deficit increases. This is because the prov- 
inces share the cyclically sensitive revenues with the federal government and 
also share in the automatic stabilizers on the expenditure side (welfare is 
provincial, employment insurance is federal, and both mushroomed in tbe re- 
cession). 
The aggregate deficit-to-GDP ratio nearly touched 10 percent in 1992-93- 
indeed, five provinces  had deficitIGDP ratios in excess of  the Maastricht 
guideline of 3 percent! 
The real “problem” provinces in 1992-93  were Alberta, Ontario, and Que- 
bec. Alberta has made a remarkable turnaround (thanks to an increase in 
revenues from oil and gas production); in  1996-97  it ran a surplus of 2.5 
percent of GDP. 
More generally, the post-1992-93  fiscal story is one of  dramatic improve- 
ment. The 1996-97 data, when finalized, are projected to yield an aggregate 
(federal plus provincial) deficit just under the 3 percent Maastricht guideline, 
with further improvement in sight. 
In  1996-97,  five of the ten provinces are in surplus, and the forecast is for 
seven to be in surplus in 1998-99.  Ontario and Quebec remain the errant 
fiscal provinces, but both are on track for budget balance by the millennium. 
Although not detailed in table 12.7, the result of this deficit-cutting exercise 
was very dramatic in government program spending as a percentage of GDP. 
From the 1992-93 level of roughly 37 percent of GDP (20 percent provincial 
and 17 percent federal), program expenditures will fall to less than 30 per- 
cent in 1997-98  (under 16 percent for the provinces and roughly 13 percent 
for Ottawa). Reductions of this magnitude in EU nations would qualify virtu- 
ally all of them for EMU entry! 
However, the fiscal news is not all good. Were one to reproduce table 12.7 
for debts and debt ratios, the results would reveal a rise in the debt/GDP ratio 
from 74.7 percent in  1989-90  to 105.9 percent in  1996-97.  While this latter 
percentage is down slightly from the peak of  106.3 percent in  1995-96,  the 
reality is that Canada has not yet come to grips with its massive debt overhang. 
Not to put too fine a point on all of this, Canadian governments now need to 
develop debt-reduction targets along the lines of the earlier deficit-reduction 
targets. More to the point, the Canadian fiscal position is clearly vulnerable to 
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12.5.3  Summary 
Since much of this volume focuses on the relationship between fiscal institu- 
tions and budgetary performance, it seems appropriate to attempt to recast the 
Canadian experience in the context of  some of  the conference themes. The 
commitment to the 3 percent Maastricht-type deficit target in the 1993 elec- 
toral platform of the victorious Liberals was no doubt an important catalyst to 
deficit reduction. But it was not much more than this because it was cast as a 
five-year goal and only applied to the federal government: the provinces were 
also running deficits in the range of 3 percent of GDP in 1993. Moreover, Fi- 
nance Minister Paul Martin’s first budget (1994) was not only very unimpressive 
on the deficit front but held out the promise for major social policy reform that, 
arguably, could have led to increased rather than decreased expenditures. Be- 
yond this, it became evident that the Canadian public was well ahead of the fi- 
nance minister in terms of its willingness to accept deficit reduction. 
What this disappointing 1994 federal budget triggered was  a dual set of 
processes-one  internal to the government and one that was capital-markets 
driven-that  led to the watershed 1995 budget. The former took the form of 
an intense struggle within cabinet between the finance minister and the social 
policy minister. This is superbly documented in Double Vision (Greenspon and 
Wilson-Smith 1996).  The result was a near-complete victory by the department 
of finance-social  policy reform became subordinated to fiscal priorities, and, 
as important, restoring fiscal integrity would be achieved principally by expen- 
diture paring. On the external and capital-markets front, the major think tanks 
in the country came down forcefully on the side not only of deficit reduction, 
but deficit elimination over a short time frame. Virtually all mainstream econo- 
mists and badfinancial economists came down on this side. This domestic 
pressure was reenforced by capital-market developments. One key aspect here 
was the peso crisis in the fall of  1994 and the suggestion, in the U.S. financial 
papers, that Canada could well be next. The other was a most unusual move 
by Moody’s-a  month or two before the 1995 budget, Moody’s placed Canada 
under a “credit watch.” 
In tandem, these developments stiffened the finance minister’s resolve and 
led to the watershed 1995 budget, including the budgetary innovations in the 
area of targets, prudence, and transparency that eventually led to budget credi- 
bility. So confident was the finance minister that the 1995 budget would as- 
suage capital markets that he invited the chief economists of  domestic and 
foreign financial institutions to a special budget “lock-up.’’ One measure of the 
newfound transparency and credibility of successive Canadian budgets is that 
this lock-up tends no longer to attract chief economists but, rather, their desig- 
nates. Indeed, now that these budgetary processes have become standard fare, 
it will be very difficult for the federal government to pull back from them, so 
much so that pressures are now mounting to shift the focus from deficit reduc- 336  Thomas J. Courchene 
tion to debt/GDP targeting. This view of the Canadian experience lends sup- 
port to the thrust of many of the papers in this volume. 
There is, however, another way  to view  the evolution of  Canadian  fiscal 
history. In my own work (1997), I have argued that one of the principal reasons 
for the run-up of deficits and debts over the last two decades had to do with 
some unpleasant fiscal arithmetic, as it were. Up until the first energy crisis in 
1973-74,  real growth rates exceeded real interest rates, often by a significant 
amount. In turn, this meant that, ceteris paribus, the debt/GDP ratio would fall. 
From the mid-1970s on, real interest rates increased relative to real growth 
rates and, in Canada’s case, eventually exceeded real growth rates by 4 percent. 
Under the old regime, one could run primary deficits (i.e,, excluding debt ser- 
vicing) and still have a falling debt/GDP ratio. No longer. Running primary 
surpluses may not lead to a falling debt/GDP ratio in an environment when 
real interest rates exceed  the real  growth rate.  The argument  would be that 
governments and fiscal institutions were very slow to recognize this profound 
change in underlying parameters and, in the process, saddled themselves with 
debt levels that began to be self-reinforcing. 
In a recent paper, Ronald McKinnon (1997) takes a different slant on this 
historical  evolution.  For McKinnon, the major turning point was the end of 
Bretton Woods and the de fact0 “softening”  of  budget constraints under the 
resulting flexible rate regime. Hence, he views EMU as an attempt by member 
countries to reimpose “hard” budget constraints on themselves, via “monetary 
separation” (severing the link between national wtral  banks and national bud- 
get authorities) and the no-bail-out clause of the EMU. This approach focuses 
on an external imposition of  hard budget constraints that would apply to all 
varieties of electoral systems and fiscal institutions, whereas most of the papers 
in this volume focus on internal innovations that would serve to “harden” bud- 
get constraints. In the Canadian case, one could mount a case that aspects of 
the McKinnon analysis appear to ring true. The federal government recognized 
that the Bank of Canada could not be deterred from its price stability strategy. 
Despite the fact that Canadian inflation rates were lower than U.S. rates, if 
nominal and, therefore, real interest rates were to fall, this required some deter- 
mined  action on the deficit front. Note that this assertion embodies two as- 
sumptions, both of which were widely accepted in Canada at the time: (i) that 
the existing high nominal rates embodied an inflation premium that related to 
the possibility that the deficit could eventually be monetized and (ii) that over 
the short term the Bank of Canada would hold firm to its price-stability stance. 
In essence, this is the definition  of a hard budget constraint since the fiscal 
authorities became boxed in-lowering  interest rates required deficit paring. 
Likewise, the deficit shifting to the provinces was also passed onward in terms 
of expenditure cuts at the provincial level since the provinces also faced hard 
budget constraints, largely enforced by the capital markets. 
How much relevance the Canadian  and McKinnon  perspectives have for 
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12.6  Recent Fiscal History: Australia 
Like Canada, Australia was savaged by  the 1990s recession. From a 1989 
manufacturing employment index of  102.7 (1990 = loo), the index was still 
languishing at 92.9 in 1995. Comparable Canadian data are 107.5 in 1989 and 
93.4 in 1995 (International Monetary Fund  1997, line 67ey). In terms of the 
overall labor market, Fortin  (1  996, 762) comments as follows: “Relative to 
the 1989 unemployment level, Canada accumulated 15.7 point-years of excess 
unemployment over  1990-95.  According to OECD standardized unemploy- 
ment  statistics,  this  is significantly more than  Japan  (2.3 point-years),  the 
United States (6.3) and the European Union (10.7). Our bad unemployment 
result has been matched only by Australia (16.3 point-years).’’  Hence, it should 
come as no surprise that Australia also registered substantial deficits during 
this period. 
However, where Australia differed markedly from Canada is that it entered 
the recession with an aggregate net debt/GDP ratio in 1990 that was not much 
above 10 percent (panel A of figure 12.2), compared with the Canadian coun- 
terpart of nearly 80 percent. By 1995, Australia’s ratio of aggregate net debt to 
GDP exceeded 25 percent, with almost all of this increase accounted for by 
the Commonwealth government. This is clear from panel B of figure 12.3: the 
Commonwealth budget balance deficit went from a surplus of almost 2 percent 
of GDP, prerecession, to a deficit of over 4 percent in 1992-93, whereas overall 
state deficits increased only slightly (lower panel). This was primarily the re- 
sult of the operations of automatic stabilizers. In particular, in the face of the 
dramatic and sustained fall in employment (alluded to earlier) the Common- 
wealth spending category “social security and welfare” soared from $25.5 bil- 
lion in  1988-89  to nearly $50 billion in  1994-95.  This was one half of  the 
problem: the other half was the revenue collapse. The behavior of outlays and 
revenues appear in figure 12.4. Note that this allocation of the burden for ac- 
commodating a recession is quite different from that which applied in Canada. 
As noted earlier, on the expenditure (outlay) front, automatic stabilizers are 
shared (unemployment insurance at the federal level and welfare at the provin- 
cial level) as are the cyclically sensitive taxes (income taxes and sales taxes). 
Hence, the 1990s recession in Canada resulted in substantial increases in both 
federal and provincial deficits. Not so in Australia, since on both the outlay and 
revenue side, the cyclically sensitive programs rest with the Commonwealth. 
However, the seemingly benign behavior of state and territory deficits (fig. 
12.3) and outlays and expenditures (fig. 12.4) masks a great deal of variation 
at the state level. All of the states in panel B of figure 12.2 record substantial 
debt increases, while low-spending  Queensland  (panel C) increased its net 
assets as a percent of GDP from 1 percent in 1988 to roughly  11 percent by 
1996. 
As is evident from these figures, Australia is now putting its fiscal house in 
order, at least on the deficit side-the  projections for the Commonwealth are 338  Thomas J. Courchene 
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Net debt in Australia: A, General government; 
for a budget surplus before the millennium. This arises largely from an "un- 
winding" of  the operations of  the automatic stabilizers in light of the recent 
strength in Australia's real growth rate. 
The projected decline in state revenues from now to the turn of the century 
(panel C of  figure 12.4) has a different explanation. As a result of  the 1995 
Competition Principles Agreement (elaborated below), CGC grants have been 
indexed for inflation through to 1998-99.  But this means that they will fall as 339  Subnational Budgetary Policies 
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a percentage of GDP since the latter is growing in real terms. Beyond this, the 
Commonwealth will extract a 2 percent “efficiency dividend” from specific- 
purpose payments made to the states. For both reasons, aggregate state reve- 
nues are forecast to fall as a percentage of GDP. 
In contrast to the earlier Canadian scenario, the Australian states are rela- 
tively sheltered from the impacts of a major recession. This, too, is consistent 
with the centralizatiodegalitarian thrust of Australia fiscal federalism. 
12.6.1  Budgetary Process Initiatives 
The Commonwealth budgetary process incorporates a feature that may well 
be unique to Australia. In comparing forecasts with actual outcomes the budget 
classifies (and publishes!) the deviations in terms of two components-param- 
eter changes (e.g., errors in forecasting GNP) and discretionary changes. In 340  Thomas J. Courchene 
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theory, this should make for much better analysis of  budgetary policy, since 
discretionary decisions are now fully transparent. Utilizing this data set, Dixon 
(1993) conducts an illuminating analysis of discretionary Commonwealth pol- 
icy over the period 1983-84 to 1992-93. This is a degree of transparency that 
has no counterpart in Canada. 
The major institutional change in the Australian federation over this period 
occurred in 1995. This was the so-called microeconomic reforms, embodied 
in the Competition Principles Agreement signed by the heads of government 
(COAG). This agreement introduces structural reform (enhanced competition, 
including cross-border competition) for state monopolies and state enterprises 
(e.g., gas, electricity, water, rail,  urban transit  [including taxis], ports,  self- 341  Subnational Budgetary Policies 
regulating professional organizations, agricultural marketing boards, and so 
on). Beyond this, the agreement seeks competitive neutrality between the pub- 
lic and private sector and provides prices oversight of utilities and other corpo- 
rations with significant monopoly power. This is truly landmark refodegis- 
lation that will serve to dramatically free up the internal common market or 
the internal economic union. More to the point, such legislation is well beyond 
the fondest dreams of even the most ardent centralists in Canada! 
Intriguingly, the states are the principal losers (financially) from the reform 
because their erstwhile fees, profits, royalties, and so on from these public trad- 
ing enterprises will decrease as a result of enhanced (and cross-border) compe- 
tition. In return, the states were promised an additional $600 million in CGC 
grants (in three tranches of $200 million each) provided that they implemented 
the reforms. Moreover, the CGC grants in totality are also indexed for inflation 
until fiscal year 1998-99.  Relatedly, and quite significantly, COAG agreed on 
a mechanism for voting amendments to the Competition Code. The Common- 
wealth will have two votes and a casting vote, with each of  the other parties 
having  a  single vote.  As  the  COAG  communiqut  notes:  “This  will  pro- 
vide meaningful State and Territorial participation in changes to the competi- 
tive conduct rules while maintaining a consistent national scheme” (COAG 
1995, 2). 
Not only does this provision further erode the states’ revenue-raising pow- 
ers, it also increases the already high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance in the 
Australian federation. Perhaps Richard Bird (1986, 242) was right when he 
noted “had Australia not been established initially as a federal country, it seems 
rather unlikely that it would be one today.” And no less an authority on federal- 
ism than W.  H. Riker (1964, 11  3) proclaimed that “the divisions in Australian 
culture seem to be economic and religious with hardly any geographical ba- 
sis. . .  . One wonders why  they bother with federalism in Australia.” In any 
event, and as alluded to in the introduction, Australia appears fully embarked 
on a version of  intrastate federalism-centralizing  powers at the Common- 
wealth (or national level) but giving the states a greater say in policy promulga- 
tion. What is not readily apparent is whether this amounts to a real say for the 
states, given the enormous leverage of  the Commonwealth arising from the 
degree of vertical fiscal imbalance. 
The final budgetary process initiative draws upon a similar New  Zealand 
initiative. Frustrated by  the fact that during the 1996 election campaign, the 
then-serving Labor  Government declared that  the  1996-97  budget  deficit 
would be $590 million with a surplus of  $2.7 billion in  1997-98,  when the 
postelection reality  revealed  deficits  of  $7.6  billion  and  $7.3  billion  for 
1996-97  and  1997-98,  respectively, Liberal treasurer Peter Costello intro- 
duced a Charter of Budget Honesty. The purpose of the charter is to provide 
comprehensive fiscal information prior to elections. Among the provisions are 
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An independent preelection report prepared by the secretaries to the Treasury 
and the Department of Finance that will provide updated fiscal and eco- 
nomic projections; 
Arrangements  for more equal access to Treasury and Finance costings of 
election commitments by the Government and the Opposition to allow the 
electorate to be better informed of the financial implications of election com- 
mitments. 
The latter provision is voluntary: the request for costing must come from the 
leaders of  the parties. However, one can be certain that if one party submits to 
such a costing, the other will certainly be pressured to do so as well. In the 
above analysis, I noted that the existence of the National Fiscal Outlook sub- 
stantially enhanced fiscal transparency and accountability. In part, the Charter 
of Budget Honesty can be viewed as a further step in this direction. If  this 
process meets with any success, it will only be a matter of time, and probably 
not much time, before it is replicated at the state level. 
12.7  States and Provinces: S&P Credit Ratings 
To conclude the analysis of subnational budgetary policies in Australia and 
Canada, table  12.8 presents the analysis by Dafoe, Shepherd, and Thiemann 
(1996) of comparative state and province credit ratings, fortuitously published 
in the November 1996 issue of Standard and Poor’s Canadian Focus. (This is 
a variant of  the analysis of Poterba and Rueben, chap. 8 in this volume.) Prior 
to focusing on the ratings themselves, it is instructive to focus on the data 
relating to per capita GDPs for the states and provinces. The Canadian data 
serve as the numeraire for the comparison. The Australian data in column 3 
are presented  in Canadian dollars using the then-existing  exchange rates- 
102.2 Canadian cents per Australian dollar. Column 4 presents the Australian 
data in terms of purchasing power parity-I35  Australian cents per U.S. dollar 
and 122 Canadian cents per U.S.  dollar (OECD data)-and,  obviously, reflects 
the fact that the Canadian dollar rate is dramatically undervalued vis-A-vis the 
Australian dollar. In terms of the “operating balance” column, the outliers are 
clearly Queensland on the up side (an operating balance equal to 18 percent of 
revenues) and Ontario and Quebec on the downside (operating “deficits” of 
12.5 percent and 9.4 percent respectively). As documented earlier, both On- 
tario and Quebec have begun to significantly turn around their deficit burdens. 
However, the real story in the table has to do with indebtedness, and here the 
evidence is clear-the  provinces are much more indebted than are the Austra- 
lian states. Setting aside British Columbia (with a debt to total revenues ratio 
less than that of  Tasmania and Victoria), all the other provinces have debt/ 
revenue ratios well in excess of the Australian states. Intriguingly, S&P does 
not focus on net debt as a percent of  own-source revenues. Because of the 
degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, this would essentially double the ratios for Table 12.8  S&P Subnational Credit Ratings: Canada and Australia 
Net Statel 
Provincial 
Debt as a 
Operating  Total  % of 
Nominal  Nominal GDP  Balance  Balance  Total 
GDP Per  Per Capita  Real GDP  as a % of  as a % of  Budget 
Senior  Capita (C$)  (purchasing  Growth  Operating  Total  Revenues, 
Rating  Outlook  1995-1996'  power parity)b  (%)b  Revenues  Revenues  1996' 
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the states in the second to last column of the table, with much smaller increases 
for the Canadian provinces. Hence, it is clear that from S&P’s perspective, the 
nationalhbnational transfers are essentially viewed as own-source revenues. 
As noted later, I find this to be a peculiar assumption. 
Now to the ratings. For Australia, they vary from AAA for the ACT, Queens- 
land, and New  South Wales to a low of AA-  for Tasmania. The provincial 
ratings are much lower-from  British Columbia with AA+ to Newfoundland 
with close to a junk bond rating, BBB+. These ratings may make eminent 
sense in terms of the debthevenue ratios in the second to last column of  the 
table. But they make much less sense if the focus were on the ratio of debt to 
own-source revenue. In my view, therefore, there are important other factors 
that S&P is (implicitly) factoring in. One is the fact that Ottawa is much more 
heavily indebted than is Canberra. Indeed, while Canberra has an AAA rating 
across the board, Ottawa has an AAA rating for its domestic debt, but only an 
AA+ rating for its foreign debt. All credit-rating agencies impose the notion 
of  a “sovereign  ceiling”; that  is, Alberta could not  acquire  an AAA rating 
across the board if Ottawa only has an AA+ rating on its foreign debt. Beyond 
this issue, I find these ratings to be very peculiar. As noted in the above analy- 
sis, not only has Alberta been running a surplus for several years (and, there- 
fore, paying down its debt) but, in addition, its own-source revenues exceed its 
expenditures and it has by far the lowest tax effort of all the provinces. Yet its 
credit rating exceeds only that of Tasmania and is lower than five of the Austra- 
lian states. Since the publication of these ratings, S&P has upgraded Alberta’s 
“outlook” (column 2) to “positive.” But this does not address the core of  the 
issue. Specifically, despite the recent alteration in the Loan Council arrange- 
ments (which are intended to have the states borrow on their own hook, as it 
were), it seems that S&P is implicitly  assuming that Canberra is ultimately 
responsible for the states’ debts. Given the nature of the Commonwealth-state 
fiscal interaction (as reflected in figure 12.1 above), this may well be an appro- 
priate assumption, but it is an assumption nonetheless. How else can one ex- 
plain the fact that S&P rates Ontario AA-,  tied with Tasmania and lower than 
any other Australian state? With Commonwealth grants equal to 185 percent 
of its own revenues, Tasmania’s debt to own-source revenue ratio would be in 
the order of 330 percent, while that of Ontario would be somewhere in the 230 
percent range.  Surely the implicit imprimatur of Canberra comes into play 
here. Thankfully, some Australians also believe that these state credit ratings 
are inflated. Walsh (1996, 119) remarks that 
notwithstanding the potential for Australia’s federal fiscal arrangements to 
encourage and sustain inefficient state decision making, the size of the Com- 
monwealth’s share in funding the states’ budgets almost certainly results in 
the states, collectively and individually, receiving “ratings” from the interna- 
tional agencies consistently higher than their less “dependent” counterparts 
in other federations. That is, the role of the ratings agencies in disciplining 
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is moderated by  an “understanding” (or presumption) that the capacity of 
the Australian states to meet their future obligations is implicitly undenvrit- 
ten by  the Commonwealth. 
Even with this important caveat, the fact of the matter is that with an overall 
debt/GDP ratio exceeding 100 percent, all levels of government in Canada are 
perilously overindebted. This is true in absolute terms, and it is even more 
evident in relative terms, given that Australia’s overall indebtedness is between 
one-fifth and one-fourth of Canada’s indebtedness. 
12.8  Conclusion 
The preceding analysis of  subnational fiscalhudgetary policies and institu- 
tions in Canada and Australia has been a comparison of polar extremes. What 
is very apparent is that the fiscal institutions buttress the salient features of 
the respective national polities. In Australia, the Commonwealth-state fiscal 
relationships are fully consistent with the centralisdegalitarian nature of  the 
federation, while the decentralized nature of the Canadian federation is surely 
enhanced by features such as the degree of subnational tax autonomy and the 
move toward unconditionality for all federal-provincial transfers. What is not 
so apparent is whether these fiscal institutions play a determining role in terms 
of defining their respective polities or whether they are largely a reflection of 
(i.e., endogenous to) deep-seated societal values. One could probably mount a 
case to the effect that Canada’s decentralization has, historically, been associ- 
ated with the demands of  the province of  Quebec, although in more recent 
years decentralization has probably been fiscally triggered. This issue is more 
complicated in Australia: for example, was  the key  High Court decision to 
label a state sales tax as equivalent to an excise tax and, therefore, preclude the 
states from entering this field, a reflection of juridical principles or was it more 
a reflection of the justices’ view of what was appropriate for Australian soci- 
ety? Note that this is not intended to be a slight against the judiciary. Now that 
Canada-United  States free trade is a reality, the Canadian Supreme Court will 
presumably give a more expansive reading to the internal free trade provisions 
of the Canadian constitution. Beyond these few observations, however, the role 
of this conclusion is to look to the future. 
For the next few years, at least, Canada is locked into more decentralization. 
Some of this is being driven by  the very real threat of a successful indepen- 
dence referendum in Quebec (likely to be held in 1999). However, globaliza- 
tion is also taking its toll on the federation. Only tiny Prince Edward Island 
now exports more to the rest of Canada than to the rest of the world. Ontario’s 
exports to the United States are running at 2.5 times the value of its exports to 
its sister provinces and are growing nearly a magnitude faster. Hence, Canada 
is no longer an east-west economy but more and more a series of cross-border 
(north-south) economies. This  increases the  pressures  for  devolution and 346  Thomas J. Courchene 
asymmetry. Hence, the challenge to the Canadian federation is how to accom- 
modate the increasing policy interdependencies among and between Ottawa 
and the provinces. One recent intriguing initiative is that the provinces have 
become more active in generating “pan-Canadian’’ public goods (Courchene 
1996a). 
Highly centralized Australia is also being whiplashed by the forces of glob- 
alization. At one level, the polarization  of  market  incomes following in the 
wake of global integration will wreak havoc with Australian egalitarianism, if 
it has not already done so. At another level, Australia  is experiencing chal- 
lenges similar to those in Canada. Western Australia is progressively integrat- 
ing internationally rather than nationally. WA’s  net imports from the rest of 
Australia  have remained  fairly constant at  $4 billion  over the  1985-86  to 
1992-93  period, whereas its net export surplus internationally has increased 
to $11  billion  in  1992-93  from $4 billion in  1987-87  (Courchene 1996b). 
Queensland also has a substantial export surplus with the rest of the world 
offset by  a similar import surplus with the rest of Australia. For the largest 
states-Victoria  and New South Wales-the  situation is reversed: they have 
large external import surpluses and large export surpluses with the rest of Aus- 
tralia. Hence the pressures for increased decentralization, at least on the part 
of several states, are potentially very strong and very pervasive. 
Earlier I indirectly suggested (drawing from Richard Bird) that had Australia 
not been constituted as a federation it would not now be one. And there is some 
sympathy in influential Australian circles to do away with the states (Macphee 
1994). However, the thrust of the previous paragraph is that there are also pow- 
erful countervailing forces pointing in a decentralizing direction. When in op- 
position, the now-ruling Liberal Party adopted a strong (for Australia!) states’ 
rights perspective. And in the run-up to the Australian Constitutional Cente- 
nary, which is replicating the various constitutional conferences one hundred 
years ago, one of the propositions that was passed was what might be termed 
the principle of “fiscal coincidence,” namely that the jurisdiction responsible 
for spending should also be responsible for raising the equivalent revenues. 
Later constitutional conferences will address the issue of vertical fiscal imbal- 
ance in more detail. In any event, the real challenge facing Canberra as Austra- 
lia approaches the millennium is whether or not it can maintain its centralist- 
egalitarian thrust. Intriguingly, Canberra’s current approach appears to be that 
of  bringing the states more fully and more formally into national decision- 
making processes rather than decentralizing powers, per se. 
In summary, my personal view is that internal pressures (i.e., policy interde- 
pendencies and externalities) will drive the Canadian federation toward more 
harmonization and coordination of nationalhubnational policies, even if  this 
coordination is “national” rather than “federal” (Ottawa imposed), while exter- 
nal pressures will eventually drive Australia toward a greater decentralization 
of powers and taxation authority to the states. 347  Subnational Budgetary Policies 
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